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CASENOTES
The Unsung Death of State Takeover Statutes: Edgar v. MITE Corp.' —In
response to the increased use of cash tender offers' as a method of achieving
corporate takeovers during the 1960's, 3 Congress enacted the Williams Act.' In
broad terms, the Williams Act was designed to protect investors by requiring
full and fair disclosure of the terms of a tender offer. 5 During the fifteen year
period following congressional enactment of the Williams Act, no less than
thirty-seven states also passed laws regulating corporate takeovers through
tender offers. 6 The simultaneous federal and state regulation of tender offers
' 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
The Williams Act does not define "tender offer" ("tender offer" and "takeover"
are used interchangeably). A working definition of tender offer has been developed, however, by
commentators. A tender offer is:
A public offer or solicitation by a company, an individual or a group of persons to
purchase during a fixed period of time all or a portion of a class or classes of
securities of a publicly held corporation at a specified price or upon specified terms
for cash [cash tender offer] and/or securities [exchange offer].
E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 70 (1973).
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has proposed a broad, two-pronged
definition of tender offer. Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. :34-16385, 3 FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 41 24,281A (November 29, 1979).
Senator Williams, the sponsor of the Act, introduced the bill on the Senate floor,
stating: This legislation will close a significant gap in investor protection under the Federal
securities laws by requiring the disclosure of pertinent information to stockholders when persons
seek to obtain control of a corporation by a cash tender offer or through open market or privately
negotiated purchases of securities." 113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967),
4 The Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, adding new sections 13(d),
13(e) and 14(d)-(f) (1968) to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
3 The Senate and House Reports explained: This bill is designed to make the relevant
facts known so that shareholders have a fair opportunity to make the decisions." S. REP. No.
550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967); H.R. REP. NO. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968), reprinted
in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2813.
Thirty-seven states have enacted takeover legislation. See ALASKA STAT. SS
45,57.010-.120 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1264 to -1264.14 (1980); COLO. REV. STAT. SS
11-51.5-101 to -108 (Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. SS 36-457 to -468 (West Supp.
1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 203 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. SS 517.35-.363 (West
Supp, 1978) (repealed 1979, West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1901 to -1915 (1977 &
Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1513 (1980 & Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch .
121 4 , SS 137.51-.70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-3.1-1 to -3.1-11
(Burns Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 502.211-.215 (West Supp. 1982-1983); KAN. STAT.
ANN. SS 17-1276 to -1284 (1981); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 292.560-.991 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981 &
Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. $S 51:1500-:1512 (West Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. fit. 13, SS 801-817 (Supp. 1982-1983); Mn. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-901 to
-908 (Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 110C, SS 1-13 (Michie/Law Co-op. Supp.
1982); MICH. STAT. ANN. $S 21.293(1)-(17) (Callaghan Supp. 1982-1983); MINN. STAT. ANN.
80B.01-.13 (West Supp..1982); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-72-101 to -121 (Supp. 1982); Mo.
ANN. STAT. $5 409.50-.565 (Vernon 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. $S 21-2401 to -2417 (1977); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 78.376-.3778 (1979) (amended 1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §5 421-A:1 to :15
(Cum. Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:5-1 to :19 (West Supp. 1982-1983); N.Y. BUS.
CORP. LAW SS 1600-1614 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. $S 78B-1 to -11
(1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. $ 1707.041 (Baldwin 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, $S 71-85
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renders the state statutes susceptible to constitutional attack on preemption
grounds. Moreover, the extraterritorial impact of state tender offer regulation
brings the state statutes under fire as posing impermissible interferences in in-
terstate commerce.
The potential for conflict between federal and state regulation manifests
itself in the divergence between the approach adopted by the Williams Act and
that adopted by many state statutes. In passing the Williams Act Congress
adopted a "market approach" to investor protection.' By emphasizing the re-
quirement of full and fair disclosure of the terms of a tender offer, the Williams
Act aids the shareholder in deciding whether to sell his stock to the tender of-
feror.° In mandating disclosure, the Williams Act was intended to favor neither
management of the target company nor the tender offeror. 9 In contrast, ex-
isting state regulation frequently permits administrative inquiry into the
substantive fairness of a tender offer, rather than merely the full and fair
disclosure of its terms.'° Furthermore, state statutes tend to inhibit tender of-
fers to a greater degree than federal regulation under the Williams Act." Given
both federal and state regulation of tender offers, there exists considerable and
variant commentary analyzing the ability of state statutes to survive constitu-
tional attacks founded on either a preemption or a commerce clause ground."
(Purdon Supp. 1981-1982); S.C. CODE ANN. SS 35-2.10 to -110 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1982); S.D.
COMP. LAWS ANN. SS 47-32-1 to -47 (Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. SS 48-2101 to -2114
(1979 & Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. SS 61-4-1 to -13 (1978 & Supp. 1981); VA. CODE SS
13.1-528 to -541 (1978 & Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. SS 552.01-.25 (West Special Pamphlet
1982); TEX. ADMIN. CODE FOR MINIMUM STANDARDS IN TENDER OFFERS tit. 7, 129,
reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 41 55,671-55,682.
7 Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on
grounds of improper venue sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). See Ken-
necott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 187-88 (3d Cir. 1980) ("A primary purpose of the Williams
Act, ... is to ensure that full information is conveyed to the shareholders of a target company as
soon as possible, so that they may exercise a knowledgeable and unfettered choice.").
8 Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d at 187-88.
9 The House Report stated:
The bill avoids tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of management or in
favor of the person making the takeover bid. It is designed to require full and fair
disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the same time providing the offeror
and management equal opportunity to fairly present their case.
S. REP. NO. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2611, 2813.
15 See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
" Fische], Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control and the Regulation
of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 28 (1978).
" The following articles and notes generally affirm the constitutionality of state
business takeover regulation premised on a lack of preemption and/or a valid regulation of in-
terstate commerce: Boehm, State Interests and Interstate Commerce: A Look At The Theoretical Underpin-
nings of Takeover Legislation, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733 (1979); McCauliff, Federalism And The
Constitutionality Of State Takeover Statutes, 67 VA. L. REV. 295 (1981); Sargent, On The Validity of
State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 OHIO ST. L. J. 689 (1981); Ship-
man, Some Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislation: The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W.
RES. 722 (1970); Comment, Challenges to State Takeover Laws: Preemption and the Commerce Clause, 64
MARQ. L. REV. 657 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Challenges to State Takeover Laws];
Note, The Constitutionality Of State Takeover Statutes: A Response To Great Western, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV.
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Federal court decisions addressing the constitutionality of state takeover
legislation are no less voluminous or discordant." In Edgar v. MITE Corp. 14 the
Supreme Court reached the merits of a constitutional challenge to a state
business takeover statute for the first time."
Plaintiff MITE Corporation, a Delaware corporation with its principal of-
fice in Connecticut, initiated a cash tender offer for all outstanding shares of
Chicago Rivet and Machine Co., a publicly held Illinois corporation." MITE
Corporation commenced its tender offer by filing with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (the SEC) in compliance with the Williams Act." Concur-
rent with its SEC filing, MITE Corporation filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois seeking a declaratory
judgment that the Illinois Business Takeover Act was preempted by the
Williams Act and that it violated the commerce clause." In addition to a
declaratory judgment, MITE Corporation sought injunctive relief prohibiting
the Illinois Secretary of State from enforcing the Illinois Act." Prior to any ac-
tion by the district court in connection with the Illinois-based litigation,
Chicago Rivet, the target company, attempted to invoke the provisions of the
Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law, but was unsuccessful. 2° The Secretary
872 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, A Response to Great Western]; Note, Securities Law and the Con-
stitution: State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note,
State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered]; Note, State Regulation of Tender Offers: How Much Is Constitu-
tional?, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 657 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, How Much is Constitutional?].
The following articles and notes generally assert that state business takeover regulation
is unconstitutional under a preemption and/or commerce clause analysis: E. ARANOW, H.
EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
- ch. 5 (1977); Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interest, Effects and Political Competency, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 213 (1977); Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their
Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1976); Note, Commerce Clause Limitations Upon State
Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Commerce
Clause Limitations]; Note, The Effect Of The New SEC Rules On The Constitutionality Of State Takeover
Statutes, 8 FORD. URB. L.J. 913 (1979-1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, New SEC Rules].
The following articles advance the theory that generally business takeover statutes
(whether federal or state) frustrate the effective functioning of the market, and, thus, operate as
deterrents to takeover attempts: Fische!, supra note 11; Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects Of
Federal And State Regulations Of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371 (1980).
" See infra notes 138-73 and accompanying text.
" 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
15
 In 1979, The Court was presented with a similar constitutional challenge. Leroy v.
Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). In that case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
had held the Idaho takeover statute unconstitutional on both preemption and commerce clause
grounds. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978). The Supreme
Court, however, reversed the court of appeals judgment for lack of proper venue without
reaching the merits of the constitutional issues presented therein. Leroy v. Great W. United
Corp., 443 U.S. at 185-87.
16
 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2633 (1982).
17 Id.
18 Id. at 2634.
I9
" Id. Chicago Rivet sought enforcement of the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law
(PA STAT. ANN. tit 70, §§ 71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983)) against MITE's tender offer, claim-
ing that Chicago Rivet maintained its principal place of business and substantial assets in Penn-
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of State of Illinois and Chicago Rivet subsequently notified MITE Corporation
that each intended to seek enforcement of the Illinois Act against MITE's
tender offer, whereupon MITE Corporation pressed its request in district court
for a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Illinois Act . 2 ' The
district court issued a preliminary injunction and subsequently entered a final
judgment. 22
 The district court declared the Illinois Act null and void because it
was preempted by the Williams Act and because it created an undue burden on
interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause. 23
 Thus, the district
court permanently enjoined enforcement of the Illinois Act against MITE Cor-
poration. 24
On appeal by the Illinois Secretary of State, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the holding of the district court."
After closely examining the legislative history of the Williams Act," the
Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that any and all state regulation of
tender offers was preempted by the Williams Act. 27 It, nevertheless, held that
the federal statute preempted the Illinois Act because investor protection by the
Act's "benevolent bureaucracy" approach conflicted with the Williams Act's
market approach of "unfettered choice by well-informed investors ." 2 e In par-
ticular, the court observed that four aspects of the Illinois Act clashed with the
federal scheme. The Seventh Circuit found that the Illinois Act (1) substituted
regulatory control for investor autonomy; (2) provided for hearings which may
be indirectly instituted by management and were interminable in length; (3)
provided other delays and mechanisms for delay which were grossly in excess of
sylvania. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 489 (7th Cir. 1980). The Pennsylvania'Securities
Commission, however, determined that it would not enforce the Pennsylvania Act against
MITE's proposed tender offer. Id. Therefore, the District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania denied Chicago Rivet's motion for a temporary restraining order. Id.
" Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. at 2634.
22 MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 490 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982). The opinion of the district court in MITE Corp. v. Dixon
is not reported.
During the interim period between the issuance of the preliminary and peri -nanent in-
junctions, Chicago Rivet made an offer to purchase 40% of its outstanding shares at a price
$2.00 per share in excess of MITE's published tender offer. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. at
2634. Chicago Rivet's offer was exempt from the requirements of the Illinois Act pursuant to the
issuer exemption. Id.
23 MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 490, aff'd sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S.
Ct. 2629 (1982).
" Id. Following the district court's final judgment, MITE and Chicago Rivet entered
into an agreement whereby both tender offers were withdrawn and each party was given 30 days
to examine the books and records of Chicago Rivet. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629,
2634 (1982). MITE agreed to either make a tender offer of $31.00 per share by March 12, 1979
(which Chicago Rivet agreed not to oppose) or to withdraw from the acquisition. Id. On March
2, 1979, MITE announced its decision not to make a tender offer. Id.
25 MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 488, aff'd sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S.
Ct. 2629 (1982).
24 Id. at 490-98.
22 Id. at 503.
78 Id. at 494.
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those deemed by Congress appropriate for the protection of investors; and (4)
provided for a lengthy pre-commencement notification delay, a requirement
specifically rejected by Congress.' 9 In dicta, the Seventh Circuit indicated that
there may be valid state regulation which is supplementary and not contradic-
tory to the Williams Act and its purposes. 3° The Illinois statute did not,
however, rise to such a status. 3 ' In addition to holding that the Illinois Act was
preempted by the Williams Act, the Seventh Circuit held that the Illinois Act
was invalid under the commerce clause." The basis of the court's holding was
its application of the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc." According to the Seventh Circuit, the Pike test requires that
where a state indirectly regulates interstate commerce, the burden imposed on
that commerce must not be excessive in relation to the local interests served by
the statute. 34 The Seventh Circuit found the Illinois Act substantially
obstructed interstate commerce without countervailing local benefit."
In Edgar v. MITE Corp., the Supreme Court held that the Illinois Act con-
stituted an indirect, yet impermissible, regulation of interstate commerce, thus
affirming the Seventh Circuit's decision." In so holding, the majority ex-
amined the benefits and burdens of the Illinois Act.'' It then applied the Pike
test and found that the Illinois Act "impose[d] a substantial burden on in-
terstate commerce which outweighed] its putative local benefits."" The
Supreme Court's commerce clause holding was based on the state's indirect
regulation of interstate commerce;" like the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme
Court did not find a direct, and hence prima facie impermissible, regulation of
interstate commerce.° In contrast to the Seventh Circuit's decision, however,
the Supreme Court's majority holding did not declare the Illinois Act un-
constitutional under the supremacy clause. 4 '
The Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp. will have a great
impact on state tender offer regulation. This casenote will evaluate the nature
of the role, if any, left by MITE for the states in the area of business takeover
regulation. Part I of this casenote will review the statutory and judicial
background of the MITE decision. First, the basic provisions of the Williams
Act will be reviewed. Next, the theoretical justification for state jurisdiction in
the field of business takeover regulation will be explored and the substance of
29 Id. at 498-99.
" Id. at 503.
" Id
" Id.
" Id. at 500-02 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
" Id. at 500.
31 Id. at 502.
36
 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2641-43 (1982).
32 Id. at 2641-42.
" Id. at 2642-43.
39 Id. at 2641-43.
'° See infra notes 209-32 and accompanying text.
4 ' See infra notes 242-57 and accompanying text.
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state regulatory schemes will be outlined. Then, this casenote will examine pre-
MITE judicial response to state business takeover statutes. Finally, the pro-
posed Uniform Take-Over Act, the response of the North American Securities
Administrators Association to pre-MITE judicial invalidation of state business
takeover statutes, will be considered. After reviewing the historical backdrop to
the MITE decision, part II of this casenote will take a closer look at the holding
of MITE. Then, following a critique of that holding in part III, this casenote
concludes in part IV that in MITE the Supreme Court effectively, although not
explicitly, destroyed the states' ability to regulate business takeover attempts
which are subject to regulation under the Williams Act.
I. PRE-MITE REGULATION OF TENDER OFFERS:
STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL CLIMATE
A. The Federal Approach: The Williams Act
The Williams Act is a federal securities statute designed to protect in-
vestors who are confronted with a tender offer. 42 Courts generally interpret the
Act as embodying a market approach to investor protection." The Act'is struc-
tured to provide disclosure of relevant information to the investor by allowing
both the offeror and the target company's management the opportunity to pre-
sent their arguments fully and then to permit the investor to make his own
choice." Although the primary focus of the Act is disclosure, it also contains
procedural rules designed to insure the fair treatment of a target company's
shareholders once the tender offer proceeds.'"
Disclosure requirements are triggered in two circumstances. First, any
person who acquires five percent or more of any class of equity securities of a
company registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 must file a
schedule with the SEC, the relevant exchange, and the target company within
ten days of reaching the five percent ownership level." The schedule must in-
clude the amount and the source of funds used for the purchase, the filer's
" See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977). See also Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975) (purpose of Williams Act is to insure that
shareholders confronted with a cash tender offer will not be required to respond without adequate
information regarding qualification and intention of the offering party).
" See supra notes 5, 7 and 9. While the neutrality of the Williams Act, as between in-
cumbent management and tender offeror, is widely recognized, the position of the SEC may be
more aligned with the interests of the tender offeror. In labelling the SEC as "pro-takeover," one
commentator pointed to the SEC-promulgated rule requiring corporations to disclose shark
repellant amendments in their proxy statements. Boehm, .supra note 12, at 660 (referring to SEC,
Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 34-15230 [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCU) 1
81,748 (October 13, 1978)). Indeed, the SEC asserted that it will review all measures "designed
to make the subject company unattractive as a potential target." Id. at 1 80,985.
44 Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276-77 (5th Cir. 1978), reo'd on
grounds of improper venue sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
45 15 U.S.C. $ 78m(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-6-.14d-7
(1982) for regulations promulgated under this section.
" 15 U.S.C. S 78m(d) (Supp. V 1981). See 17 C.F.R. S 240.13d-1(a) (1982).
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identity and the extent of his holdings in the target company." In addition, the
acquirer must state the purpose of the purchase(s) and must reveal any plans
the acquirer might have for major changes in the structure or operation of the
company." Second, the Act requires that those persons making a tender offer
for a class of equity securities registered under the 1934 Act must file a
disclosure document with the SEC, as well as any solicitation materials
prepared in connection with the tender offer, if the i.ender offer would result in
such person becoming the owner of more than five percent of that class of
security." This additional schedule provides for the disclosure of the acquirer's
past transactions with the target company, and any other material information
about the offeror. 5° The material facts include any possible antitrust or legal
conflicts which might arise as a result of the tender offer." Portions of this addi-
tional filing are required to be sent to both the target company and its
shareholders." The date of commencement of a tender offer, which triggers the
required filing of the disclosure document is defined by an SEC rule which
became effective in January, 1980. 53 Pursuant to this new rule, the public an-
nouncement by an offeror through a press release, newspaper advertisement or
public statement which identifies the offeror, the target company, the offering
price, and the number of shares constitutes the commencement of a tender of-
fer."
In addition to disclosure requirements, the Williams Act includes pro-
cedural rules intended to protect target company shareholders once a tender of-
fer goes forward." The shareholder must be given a fifteen-day withdrawal
period after acceptance of the offer." Furthermore, a shareholder may
withdraw if the offeror does not purchase the shares within sixty days from the
date of the original tender offer. 57
 If the aggregate number of shares tendered is
greater than the number of shares desired by the offeror, the Act requires a
pro-rata purchase of the shares tendered during the first ten days of the offer."
Any change in the terms of the offer, most notably the price, must be applied to
" 15 U.S.C. 78m(d) (Supp. V 1981). See 17 C.F.R. 5 240.13d-101 (1982).
48
 Id.
48
 15 U.S.C. 5 78n(d)(1) (1976). See 17 C.F.R. 5 240.14d-3 (1982).
5° 17 C.F.R. 5 240.14d-100 (1982).
" See id. 5 (5).
52
 15 U.S.C.	 78n(d) (1976). See 17 C.F,R. 5 240.14c1-3 (1982).
33
 17 C.F.R.	 240.14d-2 (1982).
54 17 C.F.R. 5 240.14d-2(b) (1982). This new definition of "commencement" of a
tender offer produced a direct conflict with the recurrent state statute provisions requiring
notification and waiting periods prior to the "commencement" of a tender offer. See Note, A
Response To Great Western, supra note 12, at 880. See also Note, New SEC Rules, supra note 12, at 931
(glaring conflict between state advance notice provisions and new SEC rule on commencement of
tender offer). It should be noted, however, that this rule was not in effect at the outset of the
MITE controversy and hence is not relevant to the MITE decision.
55
 15 U.S.C. 5 78n(d) (1976).
56 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-7(a)(1) (1982). The Williams Act initially provided for a seven-
day withdrawal period (15 U.S.C. 5 78n(d)(5) (1976)).
" 15 U.S.C. 78n(d)(5) (1976).
38
 15 U.S.C. 5 78(d)(6) (1976). See 17 C.F.R. 5 240.14d-8 (1982).
1024	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 24:1017
all tendering shareholders, even after they have tendered their shares." Final-
ly, the Act contains broad anti-fraud provisions. 60
The Williams Act, coupled with the SEC rules promulgated thereunder, is
a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme. But because only tender offers for
1934 Act reporting companies are subject to the Williams Act requirements,
not all tender offers are regulated by the federal scheme. 6 ‘ Nevertheless, tender
offers which come within the purview of the Williams Act are subject to broad
disclosure, procedural and anti-fraud rules.
B. State Regulation: Jurisdictional Foundation and Statutory Schemes
1. Jurisdictional Foundation
In addition to the federal regulatory scheme, thirty-seven states also at-
tempted to regulate tender offers by statute." The primary theoretical founda-
tion for state jurisdiction in the field of business takeover regulation is the "in-
ternal affairs'' doctrine. Traditionally, the internal affairs of a corporation are
regulated by the state of incorporation." A chartering state's right to regulate
is based on the legal fiction that there is a contract between the corporation and
the state granting the charter." Thus, because of the states' traditional interest
in the internal affairs of a corporation, state statutes generally govern
shareholders' liability, validity of stock issues, ability to merge and effect other
organic changes, election of directors, voting trusts and voting agreements,
dividends, relative rights of shareholders, and duties of officers, directors, and
controlling shareholders to the corporation and to its shareholders. 65 Pro-
ponents of the internal affairs doctrine as a legitimate jurisdictional base for
state tender offer regulation argue that a successful tender offer wilI effect a
change in corporate control, as well as in the make-up of the directors and their
22 15 U.S S 78n(d)(7) (1976).
6° 15 U.S.C. 5 78n(e) (1976). For an analysis of a tender offeror's standing to sue under
Regulation .14(e) (17 C .F.R. 5 240.14e-1 to -3 (1982)), see Note, Standing Under Section 14(e) Of
The Securities Exchange Act Of 1934: May A Tender Offeror Sue For Injunctive Relief?, 8 FORDHAM URB.
L. J. 405 (1979-1980).
Si The Williams Act covers only tender offers made for equity securities of a company
registered pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Any security traded on a national
securities exchange must be registered pursuant to section 12(a) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. S
781(a)(1976). In addition, section 12(g)(1) of the 1934 Act requires registration of any company
with over one million dollars in assets and over 750 shareholders of a class of equity securities. 15
U.S.C. 5 781(g) (1976). The SEC has issued a rule which exempts issuers from filing pursuant to
section 12(g) if on the last day of the most recent fiscal year, the issuer had total assets not ex-
ceeding three million dollars. 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 23, 292.
62 See supra note 6.
" Note, A Response To Great Western, supra note 12, at 931.
64 Id. at 932.
62 Shipman, supra note 12, at 742. See also, e.g. , MODEL'BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT,
Au-ABA COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (1979), 5 25 (Liability of
Subscribers and Shareholders), 5 33 (Voting of Shares), 5 34 (Voting Trusts and Agreements
Among Shareholders), S 36 (Number and Election of Directors), and 55 71-77 (Merger and Con-
solidation).
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governing policies. 66 It is further argued under the internal affairs doctrine that
a chartering state should regulate tender offers because a successful tender offer
may diminish the influence of certain shareholders. 67 Proponents of the doc-
trine recognize, however, that it does not neatly apply in all respects to tender
offer regulation. 68 For example, the corporate action which contractually binds
all shareholders in corporate structural changes such as mergers, consolida-
tions and liquidations is noticeably absent from the circumstances surrounding
a tender offer. 69 Yet, these proponents of state business takeover statutes do not
feel that tender offers are so different from other matters affecting the internal
affairs of corporations that they are not properly subject to state regulation."
A second justification offered to support state tender offer regulation is
protection of resident security holders. In fostering this protective goal, state
tender offer statutes arguably are like state blue sky laws." This policy
justification is weak, however, as the state interest underlying business
takeover statutes is distinguishable from that underlying state blue sky laws."
The jurisdictional base for blue sky laws is limited to shareholder situs within
the state." The Supreme Court has held that the purpose of blue sky laws is the
prevention of fraud in the sale and disposition of securities sold or affected in
the state. 74 In dismissing the effect of blue sky laws on interstate commerce, the
Supreme Court observed that, in its opinion, such laws affected interstate com-
merce only incidentally:78 , Blue sky laws touch the securities only after they
were in the hands of resident dealers." In contrast, state business takeover
statutes apply of necessity to securities both within and without the state."
Thus, courts have viewed the rationale underlying the Supreme Court's
acceptance of state blue sky laws as inapplicable to state business takeover
laws. 78
A final and often advanced justification for state involvement in the tender
offer area is the so-called "laboratory argument." Advocates of state tender of-
fer regulation maintain that the state provides a valuable laboratory for the in-
stitution and trial of regulation of securities." This laboratory analysis,
66 See, e.g., Shipman, supra note 12, at
67 Id. at 744-45.
68 Id. at 744.
69 Id.
7° Id. at 744-45.
71 Wilner & Landy, supra note 12, at 1
72 See, e.g., Great W. United Corp v.
rev'd on grounds of improper venue sub nom. Leroy v.
73 Id.
74 Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S.
Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559, 564 (1917).
" Hall v. Geiger-Jones, 242 U.S. at 5
76 Id.
" Wilner Landy, supra note 12, at 1
78 See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v.
rev'd on grounds of improper venue sub nom. Leroy v.
79 See, e.g., Shipman, supra note 12, at
744.
6.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1283 (5th Cir. 1978),
Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
6.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1283 (5th Cir. 1978),
Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
760.
539, 550 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock
59.
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however, has limitations. Courts are cautious in relying on it, and in so doing
stress the importance of non-interference by the states in areas that touch the
nation as a whole.B°
In summary, the most sound reasoning put forth to explain the propriety
of state business takeover statutes is that tender offers so involve the internal af-
fairs of a corporation that the chartering state has a legitimate interest in
regulating such offers. Moreover, the not insignificant number of proponents
of state business takeover statutes support their positions principally on the in-
ternal affairs doctrine. 81
 While other justifications for state involvement in the
area have been advanced," they are merely supplementary. Classifying tender
offers as an internal corporate affairs matter, then, is critical to a finding that
state regulation of tender offers is constitutionally permissible.
2. Statutory Schemes
Thirty-seven states have attempted to regulate tender offers by statute."
While varying significantly in content and complexity, these state business
takeover statutes possess certain common characteristics." Each state statute
addresses most, if not all, of the following key issues: jurisdiction, disclosure re-
quirements, waiting periods, state regulatory authority involvement, fairness
determinations, exemptions, uniform treatment of stockholders, pro rata take-
up, price increases, injunctive relief, and civil and criminal liability."
Jurisdiction of state business takeover statutes is generally invoked on the
basis of a combination of several factors. A statute's application will depend on
whether the target company is incorporated within the state, has its principal
place of business in the state, and/or has substantial assets in the state." The
provisions of the Illinois Act, for example, are applicable to any tender offer for
8° Justice Brandeis cautioned that such experimentation should be without risk to the
rest of the country. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1287 (5th Cir. 1978),
rev'd on grounds of improper venue sub non. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979)
(citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932): "The states in our federal
system have long served as laboratories of social experiment—free, within limits to evolve
strategies of their own to meet pressing problems. State prerogatives, however, must remain
necessarily circumscribed by the unifying requirements of the national authority as fixed in the
Constitution."). MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 488 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Edgar
v. MITE Corp,, 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
81 See, e.g., McCauliff, supra note 12, at 304; Sargent, supra note 12, at 724; Shipman,
supra note 12, at 750. See also infra note 82.
82
 There is a school of thought which advocates regulation, not by the state of incor-
poration, but rather by the state where the target company's principal place of business is located
(Note, How Much is Constitutional?, supra note 12, at 672) or that such states should have rights in
addition to those of the state of incorporation. (Boehm, supra note 12, at 757; Shipman, supra note
12, at 753-54.) The theory behind such a jurisdictional base is that the state where the business is
located has the greatest interest in the affairs of the corporation.
" See supra note 6.
84 Note, A Response To Great Western, supra note 12, at 880-81.
" Id.
86
 Id. at 881.
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which two or more of the following conditions are met: (1) the corporation has
its principal executive offices in Illinois, (2) is organized under Illinois laws, or
(3) has ten percent of its stated capital and paid-in surplus represented in Il-
linois. 87
 Many states use the Illinois criteria, 88 although jurisdiction based on
assets located in the state may require more than the minimal ten percent of
capital and paid-in surplus contained in the Illinois Act."
Another feature common to numerous state statutes is a pre-commence-
ment notification provision" similar to that of the Illinois Act challenged in
MITE. The Illinois Act provision required the offeror to notify the target com-
pany and the state securities authority of its intern to make an offer and the
material terms of such offer twenty business days prior to its effective date."
During the twenty-day period before the offer was allowed to proceed, the
target company could disseminate information to its shareholders concerning
the offer, while the offeror was barred from any such communication."
Many state statutes also address the role of the state administrative
authority in regulating tender offers. The extent of state authority involve-
ment, however, varies from state to state. In some states, statutes limit hear-
ings to determination of whether the standard of "full and fair disclosure" has
been met by the tender offeror," while in others, the state security department
is authorized to conduct substantive hearings on the fairness of proposed tender
offers." The Illinois Act, for example, confers power on the Secretary of State
to call a hearing with respect to any tender offer subject to the Act." Further-
more, it gives ten percent shareholders of the target company the right to re-
quire the Secretary to call a hearing upon their request." The offer may not
commence until the hearing is completed; however, there is no deadline for its
completion." The Illinois Act mandates that the Secretary of State deny
registration of a takeover if he finds that it "fails to provide full and fair
disclosure or that the takeover is inequitable. "98 In addition to providing for a
" ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 121 1/2, 5 137.52-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983).
" See Note, A' Response To Great Western, supra note 12, at 882.
89 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 49:5-2.m (West Supp. 1982-1983) (New Jersey Corpora-
tion Takeover Bid Disclosure Law regulates tender offers for any target company which is
organized under the laws of New Jersey, has its principal place of business in the state or a
"substantial portion of its total assets" in New Jersey).
" See, e.g., id. 49:5-3.a; IDAHO CODE 5 30-1503(4) (Supp. 1982). Colorado mandates
a ten-day waiting period. COLO. REV. STAT. 5 11-51.5-104(1) (Supp. 1982).
91 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 121 1/2, 55 137.54.B, 137.54.E (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1982-1983).
" Id. 137.54.A. It should be noted that these pre-commencement notification provi-
sions have been preempted by SEC rules promulgated after the commencement of the MITE
controversy. See supra notes 53 — 54 and accompanying text. See infra note 291.
" See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5 1707.041(B)(4) (1979).
" See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. S 49:5-4 (West Supp. 1982-1983).
95 ILL. REV, STAT. ANN., ch. 121 1/2, 5 137.57,A (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983).
98 Id.
97 Id. 5 137.57.
" Id. 5 137.57.E.
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hearing, some states also detail the inquiries to be made by the state regulatory
authority. 99 The hearing provision of the New Jersey Corporation Takeover
Bid Disclosure Law,'°° for example, was interpreted by the New Jersey state
securities bureau chief to permit inquiry into the financial condition of the of-
feror, the effect of the acquisition on the financial stability of the offeror, the
fairness of the terms of the offer, the plans of the offeror, if any, to alter the
target company's business or corporate structure (including plans to close the
target's New Jersey operations) and the economic integrity of those who would
control the target company if the offer were successful."'
Exemptions from regulation by the various state statutes are numerous
and, again, are varied.'" The most controversial recurring provision is the
"friendly offer exemption," which exempts from coverage a tender offer ap-
proved by incumbent management.'" Other transactions frequently exempted
by state statutes are offers made by an issuer to acquire its own shares,'" offers
exempted by rule or order of state securities authorities,'" offers that would
result in the acquisition of less than two percent of any class of the target's equi-
ty securities, 106 ordinary brokers' transactions"' and certain registered ex-
change offers)"
Many state business takeover statutes also contain procedural rules on
uniform treatment of stockholders, pro-rata take-up and price increases. Once
a takeover bid is allowed to proceed, these rules become operative. Some state
statutes follow the federal approach,' 09 requiring a ten-day pro-rata purchase
period,' 10 while others provide a longer period."' Similarly, some states 12 ex-
tend the right of withdrawal past the fifteen days mandated by federal regula-
tions.'" With respect to price increases which occur over the course of the
99 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. S 49:5-4 (West Supp. 1982-1983).
'°° Id.
101 Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206, 1215 (D.N.J. 1981).
102 Wilner & Landy have identified fourteen specific types of exemptions in state
business takeover statutes. Wilner & Landy, supra note 12, at 5-8.
1 " Id. at 6. One survey, which reviewed the twenty-three state business takeover
statutes in existence at the end of 1976, found that all but four of the then existing statutes con-
tained some form of friendly offer exemption. Langevoort, supra note 12, at 225. See, e.g., OHIO
REV, CODE ANN. S 1701.041(A)(1)(d) (Baldwin 1982).
104 Wilner & Landy, supra note 12, at 6. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ANN., ch. 121 1/2, 5
137.52-9(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983). Federal regulations also exempt such transactions
by virtue of the definition of "bidder," which excludes the issuer. 17 C.F.R.5 240.14d-1(b)(1)
(1982).
105 Wilner & Landy, supra note 12, at 6.
106 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT., S 11.51.5-102(5)(a) (Supp. 1982).
1 ° 7 Wilner & Landy, supra note 12, at 7.
1 °8 Id.
1" 15 U.S.C. S 78n(d)(6) (1976). See 17 C.F.R. S 240.14d-8 (1982).
110 See, e.g., S.D. COMP, LAW ANN. 5 47-32-34 (Supp. 1982).
"' See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 110C, S 7 (Michie Law Co-op Supp. 1982) (re-
quirement of pro-rata take-up is applicable during the entire tender offer).
112 see., e.g., id. (securities may be withdrawn up to five days prior to announced ter-
mination date of the tender offer).
113 17 C.F.R. S 240.14d-7 (1982).
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tender offer, state statutes generally conform to the Williams Act approach" 4
— giving to all shareholders tendering their shares the right to the increased
price." 5
 Enforcement sanctions in the state statutes typically provide for in-
junctive relief. 116
Finally, there is a novel approach adopted by some states to regulate a
"creeping tender offer.'"" "Creeping tender offer" is a term coined to
describe the gradual accumulation of shares at market price through open
market purchases." 9
 The Massachusetts provisions governing creeping tender
offers, for instance, prohibit the owner of five percent of any class of equity
securities, any of which have been purchased in the previous year, from mak-
ing a takeover bid if the offeror did not publicly announce his intent to gain
control of the target company." 9
 Practically speaking, if a tender offeror has
not announced his "intent to control, 120 he will be barred from making a
tender offer for one year after his intention is made public.'" At present, creep-
ing tender offers are not regulated by the Williams Act.
In summary, state business takeover statutes are detailed and comprehen-
sive. While the state regulatory schemes follow the general outline of the
Williams Act in most respects, they extend investor protections further than
does the Williams Act. Moreover, certain state provisions, most notably those
permitting or requiring state regulatory authority to conduct hearings on pro-
posed tender offers, differ significantly from the federal requirements. Hence,
the dual regulation of tender offers is an area ripe for conflict.
C. Pre-MITE Judicial Response to State Business Takeover Statutes
1. Preemption
When confronted with a constitutional attack on a state business takeover
statute, the courts generally have applied a preemption analysis first.'" The
114 15 U.S.C. S 78n(d)(7) (1982).
"9 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE 30-1506(3) (1980).
16 See, e.g., id. S 30-1509.
1 " See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 110C, S 3 (Michie Law Co-op. Supp. 1982);
VA CODE S 13.1-529(b)(iii) (Supp. 1982).
" 8
 FED. SEC. & L. REP. (BNA), No. 628, 11/11/81 at B-2. One court, borrowing from
defendant's brief advanced the following definition:
A creeping tender offer is an acquisition strategy where, by achieving a substantial
position in a company through open market purchases, an acquiring company can
achieve a blocking position which enables them to purchase the remaining shares by
tender or exchange offer at a cost that would be substantially less than if a formal
tender offer had been made earlier.
Televest, Inc. v. Bradshaw (E.D. Va. September 29, 1982), [current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1 9.9,044.
"9
 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 110C, 5 3 (Michie Law Co-op. Supp. 1982).
' 2° For a discussion of the standard of "intent to control," see The Massachusetts Corporate
Take-Over Statute, J. SMITH & Z. CAVITCH, MASSACHUSETTS CORPORATION LAW ch. 14A,
14A-31 (1982).
121
 For a case litigating the matter, see Agency Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Spencer Cos., 686
F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982).
122 See, e.g., MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 490 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom.
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preemption doctrine, founded on the supremacy clause of the Constitution, ap-
plies,in at least three contexts.'" First, preemption may occur because a state's
statute comes into direct conflict with a federal law. In such cases, where com-
pliance with both a federal and a state regulation is an impossibility, it is well-
settled that the state statute is void to the extent of the conflict.'" Second,
preemption also may occur at the express direction of Congress,'" because
federal regulation represents a pervasive scheme,' 26 or because federal interest
in the subject matter is so dominant as to dictate supremacy of the federal
regulation.' 27
 Finally, a state statute may be preempted if it "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress. ,, i 2 a
Prior to MITE, challenges mounted against state business takeover
statutes were not based on the impossibility of complying with both state and
federal regulations.' 29
 Neither was it strongly argued that Congress intended to
occupy the entire field.'" Indeed, parties and commentators alike usually con-
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
129 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
124 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
"' See id. at 142 (preemption of state regulatory power when the•nature of the regulated
subject matter permits no other conclusion or where Congress has unmistakably so ordained). See
also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 530-32 (1976) (Federal Meat Inspection Act ex-
pressly preempts certain standards which are in addition to or different than those of the Act).
126 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947) (United States
Warehouse Act eliminated dual regulation and substituted regulation by a single agency to
achieve fair and uniform business practices). See also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 74
(1941). (Federal Alien Registration Act of 1940 provided a "single integrated and all—embrac-
ing system" and preempted state law).
127 See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1973)
(city ordinance limiting hours of air traffic preempted by need for uniform and exclusive system
of federal regulation to fulfill congressional objectives under Federal Aviation Act).
129
 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
129 See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1275 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on
grounds of improper venue sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
139
 The savings clause of section 28(a) of the Williams Act reads: "Nothing in this
chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or officer perform-
ing like functions) of any State over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with
the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder." 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)
(1976). There has been debate as to whether this savings clause was intended to apply only to
state blue sky laws, or whether it was also designed to sanction a form of state business takeover
statute which had been passed in a sole state nearly simultaneously with the Williams Act.
(Virginia enacted the first state business takeover statute just four months prior to the passage of
the Williams Act. VA. CODE 55 13.1-528 to -541 (1978 Sr Supp. 1982)). Despite this debate, sec-
tion 28(a) is generally interpreted broadly. Thus, the section is viewed as reserving to states some
powers in securities regulation beyond the blue sky area, For instance, the Brief for the United
States Amicus Curiae for MITE Corporation summarized the position of the Department of
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cede that Congress did not intend to occupy the entire field. 19 ' Rather, the
heart of the preemption debate is whether a particular state's business takeover
statute "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress'" 32
 in its adoption of the Williams Act.'"
The interpretation of the legislative intent underlying the Williams Act is
necessarily the focal point of the preemption discussion. Cases and commen-
tators split on this subject based on their analyses of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc." 4 In Piper, the Court addressed
whether an unsuccessful tender offeror had an implied cause of action for
damages under the Williams Act provision adding section 14(e) to the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 1 " In holding that no such private right of
action existed, the Supreme Court stated that the sole purpose of the Williams
Act was the protection of investors confronted with a tender offer.'" This state-
ment forms the foundation of the defense articulated by protectors of state
business takeover statutes.'" In contrast, those who advocate preemption of
existing state business takeover statutes do so on the premise that these state
statutes, as presently constituted, frustrate the Williams Act's policy of
neutrality towards incumbent management and the offeror. Such proponents
of preemption argue that a state takeover statute is a powerful tool in the hands
of management which aids in the defeat of a tender offer.'" This position was
espoused by the Seventh Circuit in MITE Corp. v. Dixon, where it stated that
Justice:
We do not, of course, contend that the federal government has occupied the entire
field of securities regulation or that the states have no role to play ... Thus, the Il-
linois statute is not invalid simply because it regulates tender offers, but rather
because it regulates them in a way that conflicts with the Williams Act and frustrates
the accomplishment of its objectives.
Brief for the United States Amicus Curiae at 10, Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
6 SECURITIES REGULATION SERIES (BNA), No. 3 1981/1982 Term, at 50.
'" The Supreme Court has noted that section 28(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 "was plainly intended to protect, rather than to limit, state authority," Leroy v. Great
W. United Corp. 443 U.S. 173, 182 (1979), and further that "[c]ongress,. in the securities field,
has not adopted a regulation system wholly apart from and exclusive of state regulation." Mer-
rill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 137 (1973).
132 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
" 3
 Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1275 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd an
grounds of improper venue sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
"4
 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (sole purpose of Williams Act was the protection of investors). See,
e.g. , MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 495 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982); see also, e.g., Note A Response to Great Western, supra note 12, at
914-15.
'" 430 U.S. 1, 4 (1977).
136 Id. at 35.
"7 See, e.g., MITE Corp, v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 495-96, 495 n.21 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd
sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982). See also, e.g. , Sargent, supra note 12, at
713 (departure from neutrality would not, according to this school of thought, necessarily create a
basis for preemption).
'" MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 495, aff'd sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S.
Ct. 2629 (1982).
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the Illinois Act disrupted the neutrality essential to the proper operation of the
Williams Act's federal market approach.'"
Many courts and commentators have deemed state business takeover
statutes unconstitutional on preemption grounds.'" No less than eleven state
statutes have been preempted because they frustrate the market approach
adopted by the Williams Act."' The key element in the wave of preemption
holdings and supporting commentaries is the potential for delay and frustration
of a tender offer by incumbent management's defensive use of state business
takeover statutes. 142 The hearing requirement is the most offensive of the state
statutory provisions."' Typical of the approach taken by courts in striking
down these state statutes on preemption grounds was that taken by the federal
district court in Kennecott Corp. v. Smith. 144 There the court held that the New
Jersey corporate takeover law, which could be invoked unilaterally by target
management, aided incumbent management and prevented or impeded in-
vestors from exercising their right to accept a favorable tender offer."' Further-
more, the Kennecott court opined, the provisions of the New Jersey statute
delayed and obstructed tender offers, substituted state regulatory view of the
offer for the informed judgment of shareholders, burdened offerors with un-
necessary and improper disclosure requirements and delayed completion of an
offer through proration and withdrawal provisions which conflicted with the
Williams Act. 146
A few courts have upheld and commentators supported state business
takeover statutes in the face of preemption attacks."' The basic premise of
139 Id. (citing Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd
sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982)).
140 See articles and notes cited supra note 12.
141 See Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980) (New Jersey); MITE
Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct.
2629 (1982) (Illinois); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on
grounds of improper venue sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) (Idaho);
Canadian Pac. Enters., Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (Ohio); Crane Co.
v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Pennsylvania); Kelly ex rd. McLaughlin v. Beta-X
Corp., 302 N.W.2d 596 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (Michigan); Natomas Co. v. Bryan, 512 F.
Supp. 191 (D. Nev. 1981) (Nevada); Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Marley, [current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 98,246 (W.D. Okla. 1981) (Oklahoma); Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 452 F.
Supp. 1 (S. D. Ind. 1980) (Delaware); Hi-Shear Indus., Inc. v. Campbell [1981 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 197,804 (D.S.C. 1980) (South Carolina); Hi-Shear Indus.,
Inc. v. Neiditz [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,805 (D. Conn. 1980)
(Connecticut); Brascan Ltd. v. Lassiter, [current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98, 247 (E.D.
La. 1979) (Louisiana).
142 Set, e.g., MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 493 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd  sub nom. Edgar
v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
143 Id.
' 44 507 F. Supp. 1206 (D.N.J. 1981).
143 Id. at 1218.
146 Id.
'+' Strode v. Esmark, Inc., [1980] FED. SEC. L. REP, (CCH) 1 97,538 (Ky. Cir. Ct.
1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 639 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1982); Televest, Inc. v. Bradshaw,
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 197,154 (E.D. Va. 1979), vacated 618
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those who assert the constitutionality of state tender offer regulation is that the
Williams Act neutrality argument advanced by the preemptionists goes beyond
the Supreme Court's opinion in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. 18 In support
of their position, state statute advocates point to the Court's language in Piper
which identified the policy of neutrality as a characteristic, but not a purpose,
of the Williams Act. 149 Thus, they argue, in the absence of a direct conflict,
state statutes are not constitutionally infirm simply because they employ
techniques different from those in the federal scheme.'" The proponents of this
position are, however, in the minority.'" The trend prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in MITE was to strike down state business takeover legislation
on, inter alia, preemption grounds.' 52
2. Commerce Clause
Courts faced with constitutional challenges to state business takeover
statutes turned to the commerce clause issues following completion of a
preemption analysis. The commerce clause perm its only incidental state
regulation of interstate commerce; direct regulation is prohibited.'" That
regulation of tender offers has at least some impact on interstate commerce is
indisputable. Courts addressing this issue focus on the incidental, rather than
the direct, state regulation of interstate commerce.'" Within the area of in-
cidental regulation the commerce clause requires the state interests served by
the state's interference in interstate commerce to be legitimate,'" and to
outweigh the burdens imposed on interstate commerce. 156 State regulations not
meeting these standards are constitutionally impermissible.
F.2d 1029 (4th Cir. 1980). (But see infra note 281 and accompanying text for further
developments in these cases). See also Boehm, supra note 12, at 747-52; Sargent, supra note 12, at
703-20.
1 " 430 U.S.1 (1970).
119
 Id. at 29 ("Congress was indeed committed to a policy of neutrality in contests for
control, but its policy of evenhandedness does not go to ... the purpose of the legislation
Neutrality is, rather, but one characteristic of legislation directed toward a different purpose —
the protection of investors.").
sso Televest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029, 1035-36 (4th Cir. 1980).
" 1 See Sargent, supra note 12, at 713, & nn.160-61.
"2
 See supra note 141. See also Sargent, supra note 12, at 713 (most courts prior to MITE
found that one or more state statutes provisions created an obstacle to the accomplishment of con-
gressional purpose).
"2 See Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1925) (commerce clause in-
validation of North Dakota statute which asserted control over the trading of wheat, 90% of
which was destined for interstate shipment). In that case the Court differentiated between in-
direct and direct regulation of interstate commerce and said of the latter: "a state statute which
by its necessary operation directly interferes with or burdens such commerce is a prohibited
regulation and invalid, regardless of the purpose for which it is enacted."
"4 See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on
grounds of improper venue sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S, 173 (1979); see also
e.g. , MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486,500-02 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2p9 (1982).
152 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143-44 (1970).
"6 Id. at 145-46.
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The jurisdictional base, a key element of state business takeover statutes,
was the focus of considerable court examination. Courts consistently attacked
the broad extraterritorial reach of the state statutes and invalidated the statutes
on the basis of their "global" impact.'" The heart of the lower courts' com-
merce clause holdings was the failure of these state statutes to satisfy the test
first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 158 which re-
quires the balancing of benefits of the state regulation with the burdens it im-
poses on interstate commerce.' 59 In the courts' view, the burdens the statutes
placed on interstate commerce were of great consequence. Repeatedly, courts
identified the magnitude of the transactions which would be blocked by the
state business takeover statutes. Thus, in Great Western United Corp. v.
Kidwell,"° the Fifth Circuit found that enforcement of the Idaho statute "not
only had a substantial impact on interstate commerce, [but] it stopped over 31
million dollars in interstate commerce.'"" Similarly, the application of the
Delaware Act in Dart Industries, Inc. v. Conrad' 62 was found to delay the transac-
tion so as to stop over 215 million dollars in transactions, "thereby interrupting
the free flow of interstate commerce. '" 63 The lower court decisions consistently
relied on the dollar value of the tender offer as a barometer of state interference
with interstate commerce.
In analyzing the burdens imposed by the state statutes, courts also ad-
dressed conflict of laws problems presented by multiple state regulation. While
courts articulate concern over the possibility that a tender offeror may be re-
quired to comply with varying and perhaps conflicting state statutes,'" this
concern in and of itself is not responsible for the invalidation of the state
statutes. Rather it has served to further the argument that the extraterritorial
reach renders the statutes invalid.' 65
Following an examination of the burdens imposed by the state statutes on
interstate commerce, courts next scrutinize the state interests in regulating
tender offers and the concurrent benefits thereof. The broad jurisdictional base
of the statutes has been a critical flaw in arguments supporting the constitu-
tional validity of the state statutes in the face of commerce clause challenges.
The multi-pronged jurisdictional provisions of state statutes, such as that of
I" See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1281-82 (5th Cir. 1978),
rev'd on grounds of improper venue sub rum. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
136 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
159 See, e.g., MITE Corp., v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 500-02 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub corn.
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
160 Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on grounds of
improper venue sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
' 61 Id. at 1284 (emphasis in original).
1 " 462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
1 " Id. at 11.
1 " See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1284 (5th Cir. 1978),
rev'd on grounds of improper venue sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
167 Id.
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linois,' 66
 repeatedly have been held to be inconsistent with the internal affairs
justification to the extent that the statutes attempt to govern corporations other
than those chartered by the regulating state. Several lower courts have seized
upon this inconsistency in invalidating state business takeover statutes under
the commerce clause, stating that the broad extraterritorial reach of the
jurisdictional base undermines the state's articulated interest in regulating the
affairs of its domestic corporations.' 67
 The great majority of cases prior to
MITE involved state statutes with an expansive jurisdictional base and, thus,
courts did not focus on the merit of the internal affairs doctrine as a jurisdic-
tional foundation for these statutes. To the extent that a state statute restricts
its coverage to those corporations organized under its laws, however, there is
limited pre-MITE authority sanctioning state regulation on an internal affairs
theory.' 68
In addition to examining the states' interests in corporate takeover regula-
tion, courts have closely scrutinized the purported benefits of the state statutes.
The courts, for the most part, have held that the additional benefits gained by
the minimal increase in information and time, and other benefits, are
"speculative." 169
 In fact, one court noted that the additional disclosure re-
quired by a state statute might confuse, rather than aid, investors."° When
coupled with the finding that states' interests are also parochial and protective
in nature, 171
 the dubious increase in protection afforded investors has generally
led courts to hold that the state statutes, as then constituted, do not pass muster
under the Pike balancing test.'" One court in essence reached a direct com-
merce clause holding in declining to reach the Pike test because it found the
statute did not "evenhandedly effectuate a legitimate local interest with only
incidental effects on interstate commerce.'""
In sum, the federal courts prior to MITE consistently struck down existing
state regulation of tender offers. Invalidation of state tender offer statutes was
based for the most part on both preemption and commerce clause grounds.
The emphasis of the lower court decisions, however, was overwhelmingly
placed on the threshold question of preemption, rather than on the commerce
166 ILL. Rev. STAT., ch. 121 IA § 137.52-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983).
167 See, e.g., MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 501-02 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom.
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982); Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 11
(S.D. Ind. 1978).
168
 Wylain, Inc. v. THE Corp., 412 A.2d 338, 349 (Del. Ch. 1980).
168 Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1285-86, rev'd on grounds of im-
proper venue sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); MITE Corp. v. Dix-
on, 633 F.2d 486, 500 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629
(1982); Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
170 See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1285.
F 71 See, e.g., id. at 1282. The statutes are viewed by many as "thinly disguised attempts
to protect incumbent management of local industries." E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERL-
STEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 230 (1977).
172 See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 ]F.2d at 1286.
173 Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206, 1223 (3d Cir. 1980).
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clause. The commerce clause holdings of the lower courts focused primarily on
the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the state regulation. Absent a preemption
holding many decisions, either implicitly or explicitly, left open the possibility
of more narrowly drawn state statutes in the area of tender offer regulation.
D. Proposed Uniform Take-Over Act
In an attempt to respond to lower court invalidation of state business
takeover statutes, the North American Securities Administrators Association,
Inc. (NASAA) proposed the Uniform Take-Over Act (Uniform Act). 14
NASAA, an organization comprised of state securities officials from across the
country, proposed the Uniform Act to provide a model which would foster
uniformity in state regulation of securities while still providing an effective state
presence.'"
The Uniform Act takes as its premise that the regulation of takeovers is
properly and legitimately within the purview of the state's authority as a matter
of corporate law. 16
 Thus, of crucial import to the validity of the proposed
Uniform Act is the legitimacy of the internal affairs doctrine. Indeed, the pro-
posed Uniform Act attempts to avoid one of the fatal flaws of the Illinois Act —
its broad extraterritorial impact — by restricting a state's jurisdiction to tender
offers for shares of a company which is incorporated in the state adopting the
Uniform Act.'" Further, the proposed Uniform Act's jurisdictional section
contains a discretionary provision which, if adopted, gives a state securities ad-
ministrator the power to tailor further the Act's jurisdictional scope. 18 Pur-
suant to this provision, the administrator may specify additional criteria, such
as a number or percentage of offerees residing in the state, which must be met
before the Act's provisions will apply.'" Thus, the NASAA proposal attempts
to avoid the pitfalls of overly broad jurisdiction that had previously resulted in
the invalidation of state business takeover statutes.
NASAA also addressed a second important and often constitutionally fatal
group of provisions of state business takeover statutes — exemptions from the
Act's requirements. Courts have viewed exemptions as important in discerning
the evenhandedness of the state regulation. Thus, the drafters of the Uniform
Act responded to judicial and scholarly criticism by omitting the "friendly of-
fer" exemption.'" This exemption, incorporated in many invalidated state
business takeover statutes, excludes from coverage takeover bids approved by
the management of the target corporation."' While the "friendly offer" ex-
"6 NASAA Tender Offer Proposals, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA), No. 626, 10/28/81, G-1
to G-6 [hereinafter cited as NASAA Tender Offer Proposals}.
'" Id. at G-1 (Report of the Tender Offer Committee of the NASAA).
"6 Id. (Report of the Tender Offer Committee of the NASAA).
1 " Id. at. G-3 (Uniform Act, 3(k)).
1 " Id.
179 Id,
1"° Id. at G-1 (Report of the Tender Offer Committee of the NASAA).
181 See sspm text accompanying note 103.
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emption was omitted from the NASAA proposal, certain other tender offers are
eligible for exemption from the proposed legislation's requirements.'"
The proposed Uniform Act requires a registration statement from any
person who makes a takeover offer which, if accepted, would result in the of-
feror becoming directly or indirectly the owner of more than five percent of a
class of equity securities of a company.'" The registration statement must
make a full, fair and effective disclosure of all material facts necessary for a
shareholder to. make an informed decision concerning the takeover offer.'"
The disclosures required are detailed and are similar to those required on the
federal level.'" One additional element of the proposed Uniform Act's reg-
istration statement not required by federal regulation, however, is a description
of any tender offer made by the offeror in the past five years and of any acquisi-
tion of another business made by the offeror in the last five years, as well as any
material change in the organization or operation of such business.'a 6
In addition to the jurisdictional and disclosure provisions, the proposed
Uniform Act contains a section governing enforcement of the Act's re-
quirements through hearings and administrative action.'" The major substan-
tive difference between the hearing provisions in the Uniform Act and those in
the various state statutes held to be preempted is the articulated goal of such
hearings. The hearings conducted pursuant to the Uniform Act are to ensure
only full and fair disclosure in complying with the Act's registration re-
quirements,'" whereas the invalidated state statute hearing provisions gave
power to the regulatory authority to pass on the equitability of the tender
offer. 1 B 9
 The proposed Uniform Act's hearing period is limited to a maximum
of sixty days. In addition, an order by the administrator barring the tendering
of shares pursuant to an offer will automatically expire unless the administrator
has determined non-compliance with the Uniform Act. 19° Upon an un-
favorable outcome of a hearing, the state regulatory authority is required to
182 NASAA Tender Offer Proposals, supra note 174, at G-1 to -4 (Uniform Act, S 4). The
following transactions are exempted from the registration requirements under the Uniform Act:
(i) an offer made by an issuer to purchase its own equity securities, or the equity securities of a
subsidiary at least two-thirds of which are owned by the issuer/bidder (5 4(a)), (ii) purchases by a
broker in customary brokerage functions (S 4(b)), (iii) an offer to purchase the equity securities of
a target having less than 100 shareholders (5 4(c)), (iv) an offer which would result in less than
two percent of the securities being acquired (5 4(d)), (v) an offer which the state securities ad-
ministrator exempts from coverage because it does not have the effect of changing or influencing
the control of the company (S 4(e)) and (vi) an offer which is subject to substantive federal agency
review and which the state securities administrator determines meets the purposes of the Act (S
4(f)). Id. at G-3 to -4.
183 Id. at 0-3 to -4 (Uniform Act, 55 3(j), 5(a)).
184 Id. at G-4 (Uniform Act, 5 5(b)).
'" Compare 17 C.F.R. S 240.14d-100 (1982) with id.
186 NASAA Tender Offer Proposals, supra note 174, at G-4 (Uniform Act, 5 5(b)(i)(10)).
1 A 7 Id. at G-5 (Uniform Act, 5 6).
188 Id. (Uniform Act, 5 7(b)).
189 ILL. REV. STAT. ch . 121 Si, 5 137.57.E (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983).
19° NASAA Tender Offer Proposals, supra note 174, at G-5 (Uniform Act, 5 7(b)).
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issue an order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law prohibiting the
purchase and payment for any equity securities tendered in response to the
takeover offer, or conditioning any such purchase and payment upon changes
or modifications in the registration statement. 19 ' The administrator, reading
between the lines of the proposed Uniform Act, thus has the power to block the
tender offer.
The proposed Uniform Act is also applicable to tender offers not falling
within the jurisdiction of the Williams Act.'" Non-Williams Act takeover of-
fers are subject to the Uniform Act's registration requirements reviewed above,
and also are subject to a minimum twenty-day period for holding the offer
open, 193 withdrawal rights for fifteen days,'" pro-rata purchase requirements
when the offer is for less than all the shares of the corporation'" and a require-
ment to pay an increased premium price to all shares tendered. 196 These pro-
cedural protections are similar to those provided by the Williams Act with
respect to-tender offers for 1934 Act companies.'"
Finally, there are two notable areas where the Uniform Act's drafters have
bowed to the federal scheme. First, the ,Uniform Act does not require prora-
tion, withdrawal and shareholder protections with respect to transactions sub-
ject to regulation by the Williams Act.'" These omissions are designed to help
NASAA's proposed Uniform Act escape the criticism leveled against in-
validated state statutes that the additional protections granted by the state
scheme are only speculative or marginal in nature.' 99 Secondly, the Uniform
Act's official text does not regulate the area of "creeping tender offers.,,200 The
Tender Offer Committee of the NASAA has taken the position, however, that
open market and privately negotiated transactions are not adequately reg-
ulated by the current federal system."' While the Committee has offered two
unofficial provisions to be adopted by any state wishing to deal with this prob-
lem, the Committee explicitly adovocates federal regulation of creeping tender
offers."2
In sum, NASAA created the proposed Uniform Act in respose to judicial
antagonism to broad, sweeping state regulation of business takeovers. Never-
theless, the proposed legislation, drafted prior to the MITE decision, does more
than simply fill the gap left by the Williams Act with respect to non-1934 Act
1s1
192 Id. (Uniform Act, 5 8).
193 Id. (Uniform Act, $ 8(d)).
19' (Uniform Act, $ 8(e)).
199 Id. (Uniform Act, $ 8(f)).
"o Id. (Uniform Act, $ 8(g)).
1" See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
198 See NASAA Tender Offer Proposals, supra note 174, at G-5 (Uniform Act, 5 8).
199 See supra text accompanying notes 169-172.
200
	 supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
"I NASAA Tender Offer Proposals, supra note 174, at G-1 (Report of the Tender Offer
Committee of the NASAA).
202 Id. at G-1 to -2 (Report of the Tender Offer Committee of the NASAA).
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companies. It also provides an additional level of shareholder protection, most
notably in the form of a regulatory hearing which has the potential for blocking
a tender offer.
E. Background Summary
A two tier set of regulations governing cash tender offers has emerged in
the last fifteen years. On the federal level, Congress enacted the Williams Act,
which, when coupled with SEC rules, is a comprehensive regulatory scheme
designed to protect investors confronted with a tender offer. Similarly, states
have acted to provide such protection. State business takeover statutes are
founded primarily on the premise that a tender offer involves the internal af-
fairs of a corporation and, hence, the chartering state has a legitimate interest
in regulation of tender offers for domestic corporations. 203 While these state
statutes in certain respects differ significantly from the federal regulatory
scheme, they in many ways parallel the Williams Act. 2 °4 Addressing the con-
stitutionality of such state regulation of tender offers, federal courts prior to
MITE consistently struck down existing state statutes, both on preemption and
commerce clause grounds. 205 Seeking to retain some state influence in this
area, and in response to judicial invalidation of state business takeover regula-
tion, NASAA proposed the Uniform Take-Over Act. 206 So stood the tenuous
status of state tender offer regulation prior to MITE.
II. THE MITE DECISION: A CLOSER LOOK
In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 207 Justice White delivered a five part opinion of
which only two parts and one additional subpart commanded a majority of the
Court. First, to reach the merits of the case, a majority of the justices held that
the case was not moot. 208 Then a different majority of justices affirmed the
judgment of the Seventh Circuit and its holding that the Illinois Act imposed a
substantial burden on interstate commerce which outweighed its putative local
2°' See supra notes 63-82 and accompanying text.
2 °4 See supra notes 83-121 and accompanying text.
20' See supra notes 122-73 and accompanying text.
206
 See supra notes 174-202 and accompanying text.
207 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
2 ° 0 Id. at 2635. A five justice majority joined in holding the case was not moot. (Justice
White, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun. Id. at 2633. Stevens, J., concurring.
Id. at 2643-48. O'Connor, J., concurring. Id. at 2643.) The basis of this holding was that a re-
versal of the judgment of the district court would expose MITE to civil and criminal liability for
making a tender offer in violation of the Illinois Act and that any such action would be foreclosed
if the statute were held unconstitutional. Id. at 2635. The plurality opinion chose not to resolve
the question of whether the preliminary injunction issued by the district court was a complete
defense to civil or criminal penalties. Id. In so doing, the plurality opined that this important
issue should be decided when and if the Secretary of State of Illinois initiates an action against
MITE. Id. Justice Stevens conditioned his opinion on the merits on his determination that the
preliminary injunction cannot be "construed as a grant of absolute immunity from enforcement
of the Illinois statute." Id. at 2647. Justice Powell reached the merits despite his opinion that the
case was moot. Id. at 2643.
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benefits and was therefore invalid under the commerce clause. 209 No majority
of the Court, however, embraced the lower court's holding that several provi-
sions of the Illinois Act were preempted by the Williams Act. 210
The Supreme Court held in MITE that the Illinois Act is unconstitutional
because it failed to satisfy the balancing of benefits and burdens test set forth in
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 2" In relying on the Pike test, the majority reiterated
that even when a state indirectly regulates interstate commerce, the burden im-
posed on that commerce must not be excessive in relation to the local interests
served by such regulation. 212 The majority first identified the "most obvious"
burden imposed by the Illinois Act on interstate commerce: the nationwide
reach of the statute. 2 " The statute, the majority observed, gave the Illinois
Secretary of State the power to block a tender offer anywhere in the nation. 214
According to the majority, the exercise of such power could deprive share-
holders of the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium, 215 as well as hinder
economic efficiency and competition. 215
After identifying the substantial burden imposed by Illinois on interstate
commerce, the majority next examined the two local interests advanced by Il-
linois in support of its regulation of tender offers."' The articulated interests
were the protection of resident security holders and the regulation of the inter-
nal affairs of corporations incorporated in Illinois. 215 With respect to the first
state interest, the majority acknowledged that a state has a legitimate interest
in protecting local investors but emphatically held that states do not have any
interest in protecting non-resident shareholders. 219 The statute, the majority
observed, by potentially burdening transactions nationwide, extended its
coverage to out of state shareholders. 22° Moreover, the majority noted, the Il-
linois Act exempted from coverage a corporation's acquisition of its own
shares.'" This exemption, the majority stated, left shareholders with only the
2" Id. at 2643. Justice White, joined by The Chief Justice. Id. Powell, J., concurring.
Id. Stevens, J., concurring. Id. at 2647-48. O'Connor, J., concurring. Id. at 2643.
2 " Id. Justices Stevens and O'Connor, despite their joining in Part I of the opinion, ap-
pear to be joining only the commerce clause, and not the preemption holding. Id. at 2643,
2647-48.
2 " Id. at 2641-43 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). Justice
White is joined in this part of the opinion by The Chief Justice. Justices Stevens, Powell and
O'Connor concurred in the holding of the statute's infirmity under the Pike test. (Powell, J., con-
curring. Id. at 2643. Stevens, J., concurring. Id. at 2647-48 O'Connor, J., concurring. Id. at
2643).
212 Id. at 2641.
219 Id. at 2641-42.
"4 Id. at 2642.
215
216
	
In so concluding, the majority relied on various economic analyses, Id.
217
218 id.
239 Id.
229 Id. ("Insofar as the Illinois law burdens out-of-state transactions, there is nothing to
be weighed in the balance to sustain the law.").
221 Id.
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protections provided by the federal securities laws with respect to such an ac-
quisition. 222 In the majority's view, Illinois here undermined its justification
for the burdens its statute imposed on interstate commerce because Illinois had
previously asserted the inadequacies of the federal regulatory scheme."'
The majority then questioned Illinois' assertion that the Act substantially
enhanced the shareholder protection afforded by the Williams Act. 224 Adopting
the Seventh Circuit's analysis, the majority found such additional state protec-
tions "speculative.' '"' Moreover, the majority stated that any potential addi-
tional benefits conferred by the statute were possibly outweighed by the risk
that the tender offer would fail as a result of defensive tactics instituted by in-
cumbent management. 226
Finally, the MITE majority squarely rejected the second interest proffered
by Illinois: regulation of the internal affairs of domestic corporations. 227 The
internal affairs doctrine, the majority opined, was a conflict of laws principle
and as such was of "little use to the state in this context. " 228 Furthermore, the
majority stated that transfers of stock by a stockholder to a third party did not
themselves implicate the internal affairs of a corporation. 229 Just as the majori-
ty had rejected Illinois' first articulated interest as speculative and inconsistent,
the majority discounted Illinois' second interest due to its inconsistency. 230 In
so doing, the majority pointed out that the regulation of foreign corporations
which are neither incorporated nor headquartered in Illinois was not supported
by the internal affairs doctrine."' Thus, the majority held that the Illinois Act
imposed an indirect but substantial burden on interstate commerce which out-
weigh its putative local benefits. 232 The majority opinion, however, constitutes
but a small portion of the Edgar v. MITE Corp. decision. Justice White, as well
as the concurring and dissenting justices, wrote significant additional opinions
" on the merits.
Justice White, author of the majority opinion which held that the Illinois
Act was an indirect yet impermissible burden on interstate commerce under
the Pike test, also found that the Illinois Act constituted a constitutionally pro-
hibited direct regulation of interstate commerce."' In this portion of his opin-
222 Id.
223 Id.
"4 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 2642-43.
228
 Id. at 2643.
229 Id.
2" Id.
231 Id. (The Illinois Act applies to tender offers for any corporation of which 10% of the
outstanding shares are held by Illinois residents. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 121 , S 137.52-10
(Supp. 1980)).
232 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. at 2643.
233 Id. at 2640-41. This Part V-A of the opinion was joined in by The Chief Justice, and
concurred in by Justices Powell and O'Connor (Powell, J., concurring. Id. at 2643. O'Connor,
J., concurring. Id.) This invalidation of the Act on the basis of a direct regulation of interstate
C
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ion, Justice White distinguished tender offer regulation from state blue sky
laws. 234 He emphasized the interstate nature of the tender offers communicated
by mails, and relied on Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co. 235 to invalidate the Illinois Act
as a direct regulation of interstate commerce. 236 In addition, Justice White em-
phasized the "sweeping extraterritorial effect" of the Illinois Act. 237 The
statute, he pointed out, reached foreign corporations which might in fact have
no shareholders located in the state. 238 Such an assertion of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, stated Justice White, was similar to the unconstitutional regula-
tion of interstate commerce struck down in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona2" and
Shafer v. Heitner 2" by the Court."'
The remaining substantive portions of Justice White's opinion contained
a strong preemption attack, joined in by The Chief Justice and Justice
Blackmun.'" Justice White was persuaded that the intention of Congress in
enacting the Williams Act was to regulate takeovers while maintaining a
balance between the investor, management and the takeover bidder.'" The Il-
linois Act frustrated this congressional intent, opined Justice White, because it
tipped the scales towards incumbent management. 244 Specifically, Justice
White found that the Illinois Act, in the provisions requiring a twenty-day pre-
commencement notification provision and delaying the commencement of a
tender offer pending completion of a hearing, provided incumbent manage-
ment with a powerful tool to combat a tender offer. 245 Thus, by favoring
management at the expense of stockholders, the Illinois Act violated the
balance struck by Congress.'"
Central to Justice White's preemption holding was his interpretation of
the legislative history of the Williams Act. He stressed that several times Con-
gress rejected proposed provisions or amendments to the Williams Act which
would have imposed a pre-commencement notification requirement similar to
commerce falls short of reaching a majority by one vote.
234 Id. at 2640-41.
235 268 U.S. 189 (1925) (commerce clause invalidation of North Dakota statute which
asserted control over the trading of wheat, 90% of which was destined for interstate shipment).
236 Edgar v. MITE Corp. 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2641 (1982).
2" Id.
"a Id.
239 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (Arizona Train Limit Law restricting the number of cars on
passenger and freight trains invalidated under the commerce clause because state interest in safe-
ty outweighed by national interest in free flow of commerce and need for uniformity of regula-
tion).
240 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (assertion of jurisdiction by state of Delaware on basis of
statutory presence in state of capital stock owned by defendant did not establish constitutionally
adequate "minimum contacts" to support state jurisdiction).
241 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2641 (1982).
242 Id. at 2635-40.
243 Id. at 2636-37.
244 Id. at 2637-38.
145 Id. at 2637-39.
246 Id.
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that contained in the Illinois Act. 247
 Similarly, Justice White noted that the
potential for delay inherent in the Illinois Act's hearing provision upset the
balance between offeror, management and shareholder, by favoring manage-
ment at the expense of stockholders."' With respect to the substantive hearing
provisions of the Illinois Act, Justice White agreed with the Seventh Circuit
that the state was protecting investors at the expense of their autonomy. 249
Justices Powell, Stevens and O'Connor each wrote separate concurrences,
while Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan," and Justice Rehnquist"'
both wrote individual dissents. Justice Powell concurred with the majority of
the Court in its holding that the Illinois Act failed to meet the Pike balancing
test applicable to indirect state regulation of interstate commerce. 252 Justice
Powell's concurrence was based on narrow grounds. He explicitly stated that
he was joining in the opinion of the Court only because its reasoning "le[ft] •
some room for state regulation of tender offers. " 253
 Justice Stevens joined the
Court in its commerce clause invalidation of the Illinois Act under the Pike test,
and also joined the section of Justice White's opinion which declared that the
Act constituted a direct, and hence impermissible, restraint on interstate com-
merce. 254
 In his concurrence, however, Justice Stevens expressly rejected
Justice White's preemption holding because he was not convinced that the con-
gressional "policy of neutrality in its own legislation [was] tantamount to a
federal prohibition against state legislation designed to provide special protec-
tion for incumbent management. "255
 O'Connor affirmed the judgment
of the Seventh Circuit, but only on the basis that portions of the Illinois Act
were invalid under the commerce clause. 256 She found, therefore, that it was
unnecessary to reach the merits of the preemption issue."'
247 Id. at 2637-38 & n.11.
248 Id. at 2639.
242 Id. at 2639-40.
25G Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented from the majority on the basis
that the case did not present a live controversy and hence was moot. Id.• at 2648 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Contrary to both the majority's reservation of the issue of the effectiveness of the
preliminary injunction issued by the district court and Justice Stevens' finding that the
preliminary injunction did not permanently protect MITE (see supra note 208), Justice Marshall
stated that the preliminary injunction would constitute a complete defense to any actions against
MITE. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. at 2648. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
251
 Justice Rehnquist agreed with Justice Marshall that the case presented no justiciable
controversy, but for a different reason. Id. at 2652 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). According to
Justice Rehnquist, MITE Corp. no longer needed the protection of the injunction issued in the
case. Id. at 2353 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the possibility of a future enforcement
action is insufficient, in Justice Rehnquist's opinion, to keep the controversy alive. Id. (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
252 Id. at 2643.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 2647-48.
2" Id. at 2648.
256 Id. Justice O'Connor joined in Parts I, II and V of justice White's opinion (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring. Id. at 2643.).
257 Id.
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In review, a five member majority of the Court 258 held that the case was
not moot. A different five member majority 259
 embraced the opinion of the
Court that the Illinois Act was invalid under the commerce clause because the
local interest served by the statute did not outweigh the burdens it imposed on
interstate commerce. The portion of Justice White's commerce clause opinion
finding that there was a direct and unconstitutional interference with interstate
commerce mustered a plurality, but failed to command a majority of the
members of the Court. The three concurring justices, who completed the
majority holding the statute was unconstitutional as an indirect interference in
interstate commerce, all joined for individually articulated reasons. Justice
Blackmun, who did not write any opinion, joined all but the portions of Justice
White's opinion which declared the Illinois Act unconstitutional as both a
direct and an indirect interference in interstate commerce. Finally, because the
three dissenters did not reach the merits, their views on the majority's opinion
are unknown. 26° Thus, while there was achieved a majority rendering an opin-
ion which invalidated the Illinois Act on narrow commerce clause grounds, the
opinion of the Court in Edgar v. MITE Corp. did not explicitly and definitively
decide the fate of remaining or future state tender offer regulation. As will be
developed below, however, the opinion of the Court provided the lower courts
with the weapon necessary to destroy the future of state regulation of tender of-
fers within the scope of the Williams Act.
III. CRITIQUE OF MITE
The opinion of the Court in Edgar v. MITE Corp. was vastly different than
the outcome foreshadowed by the lower court decisions. The Illinois Business
Take-Over Act was found constitutionally infirm through the application of the
subjective balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 261
 Lower court decisions,
however, gave at least equal if not greater weight to invalidation of state
business takeover statutes on preemption rather than commerce clause
grounds. 262
 Similarly, an overwhelming number of commentators argued for
preemption of the statutes. 263
 It is, therefore, important to examine the opinion
of the Supreme Court with a critical eye to both its inclusions and exclusions.
The absence of any preemption holding by the Supreme Court is, indeed,
surprising in light of the lower court trend. 264
 There are at least two possible ex-
planations for the Supreme Court's failure to indorse the preemption position.
First, Justice White's reliance on the subjective interpretation of legislative
258 See supra note 208.
m See supra note 209.
'60
 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2648-54 (1982).
261 Id. at 2643.
262 See supra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
263 See supra note 12.
2" See supra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
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history of the Williams Act265
 may shed light on the Court's unwillingness to
join him in preempting all state business takeover regulation. A second and
much more convincing explanation is the Burger Court's well-known receptivi-
ty to state interests. The general direction of the Burger Court decisions has in-
dicated a shift from a federal leaning towards a state-directed doctrine. 266 The
failure of Justice White to attract a majority on his preemption holding may, at
first blush, be interpreted as a signal that the Supreme Court did not foreclose
state involvement in the area of tender offer regulation. The absence of a ma-
jority concensus on the preemption issue presented in MITE, however, must
be juxtaposed with the remaining portions of the opinion.
The foundation of the Supreme Court's opinion was that the Illinois Act
was an unconstitutionally burdensome indirect regulation of interstate com-
merce under the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. balancing test. 267
 A close examination
of the majority opinion reveals, however, that the state's proffered interests
were in fact rejected, rather than balanced, against the countervailing benefits
of the Illinois Act. The first of Illinois' asserted interests was identified as the
protection of resident security holders. 268
 While Justice White conceded that
the protection of local investors was clearly a legitimate state interest, he stated
that "Iiinsofar as the Illinois law burdens out-of-state transactions, there is
nothing to be weighed in the balance to sustain the law.' ' 269
 Implicit in this pro-
nouncement, which appears to be a carryover from Justice White's direct com-
merce clause holding, is a finding that no incidental regulation of out-of-state
transactions is permissible. This is tantamount to saying that there may be no
"' The Chief justice warned in Piper that "[R]eliance on legislative history in divining
the intent of Congress is ... a step to be taken cautiously." Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc, ,
430 U.S. 1, 25 (1977). Despite The Chief Justice's language in Piper, he joined Justice White's
entire opinion, including the preemption holding which relied heavily on interpretation of
legislative history. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2635-43 (1982).
266
 As one commentator suggests: "[f]ederal-directed preemption dominated the
Court's jurisprudence in the 1950's and the early 1960's, but ... several recent decisions of the
Burger Court presage a return to the state-directed preemption doctrine. This doctrinal incon-
sistency merely manifests the Court's vacillating perspective on federalism." Note, The Preemp-
tion Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives On Federalism And the Burger Cour!, 75 CoLum. L. REV. 623, 626
(1975).
See also A Response to Great Western, supra note 12, for an opinion that there are "signals
from the Burger Court that suggest solicitude toward state interests and that recognize the com-
plementary nature of federal and state securities regulation." Id. at 872.
See also Wilner Landy, supra note 12, for a discussion of the shifting nature of the
Court's preemption actions: "During the 1930's the Court required a showing that Congress ex-
pressly intended to occupy a field.... Starting in the 1940's the Court began to infer a congres-
sional intent from the pervasiveness of federal legislation." Most recently, the Court appears to
be shifting back to requiring a direct showing of congressional intent, which may be evidenced by
the statutory language or legislative purpose." Id. at 24 n.135. But see Fidelity Federal Savings
and Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3031 (1982) (Federal Home Loan Bank Board
"due-on-sale" regulations preempt conflicting state limitations on "due-on-sale" practices).
267 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
266
 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2642 (1982).
265 Id.
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tender offer regulation by the states. Yet this portion of the opinion purports to
be a subjective test, applied on a case by case basis.
Other passages of the majority opinion are much less decisive than the
above cited declaration, leaving unsettled the threshold issue of whether any
state regulation of tender offers would be permissible. For instance, the majori-
ty opinion's emphasis on the inadequacy and speculative nature of the protec-
tions extended by the Illinois Act to resident security holders 270 suggests, albeit
most faintly, that provisions different than those in the Illinois Act might be
tolerated. Furthermore, the majority targeted the Illinois Act's friendly offer
exemption as a fatal inconsistency in Illinois' assertion that the Act was de-
signed to provide additional shareholder protection. 271 The question of whether
statutes excluding such an exemption might be acceptable is left unanswered.
A crucial issue not clearly disposed of by the majority holding, then, is whether
there may be any out-of-state impact coincident with a state's regulation of
tender offers. If not, the very nature of a tender offer precludes any state
presence in the field.
Continuing its application of the Pike balancing test, the majority iden-
tified Illinois' second defense: that it had an interest in regulating the internal
affairs of a corporation incorporated under its laws. 272 The majority correctly
pointed out the inconsistency in justifying the statute on these grounds when,
in fact, the Illinois Act applied to tender offers for any corporation in which ten
percent of the outstanding shares were held by Illinois residents. 2 " In addition,
however, the majority opinion perfunctorily dismissed the corporate internal
affairs doctrine as a "conflict of laws principle. " 274
 This statement overlooked
the initial and crucial inquiry into what matters constitute the "internal
affairs" of a corporation. The opinion continued, however, by stating that
"[gender offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party
and do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target company. "2r5
The cornerstone of state jurisdiction in the field of takeover regulation is thus
destroyed by one sentence in the majority opinion. This rejection of the inter-
nal affairs doctrine was considerably more resounding than that in the Seventh
Circuit's holding. 276
 There, the court did not summarily reject the internal af-
fairs argument, but rather focused on the global impact of the Illinois Act."'
Finally, in stating that Illinois did not have an interest in regulating the inter-
nal affairs of foreign corporations, the opinion does not take notice of the fact
that Chicago Rivet, the target company in MITE, was an Illinois corporation.
"0 Id.
271 Id.
272
273 Id. at 2643.
274 Id.
7" Id.
276
 MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 501 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
277 Id.
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The Supreme Court's use of the Pike balancing test, rather than a less flex-
ible standard such as preemption, suggests that, indeed, there may be state
tender offer statutes which will escape constitutional invalidation. The MITE
decision, however, supports this conclusion only by virtue of the slim majority
created by Justice Powell's concurrence. Justice Powell, the only member of
the Court who squarely addressed whether the MITE opinion permitted any
tender offer regulation by the states, concurred on the sole ground that the ma-
jority opinion left some room for state involvement in the area. Moreover, this
implicit suggestion read by Justice Powell into the majority's use of the Pike
balancing test is largely undercut by the actual language of the majority opin-
ion. 278
 Further dashing the hopes of state statute advocates, the other two con-
curring justices, Justices Stevens and O'Connor, both joined the direct and in-
direct commerce clause holdings in Justice White's opinion, thereby pre-
cluding, in their opinions, any state regulation in the field.
While the Illinois Act was struck down by the Supreme Court in MITE,
there are thirty-five remaining state statutes 2" whose constitutional validity
must be examined in light of Edgar v. MITE Corp. At a minimum, the MITE
holding drastically curtails the permissible jurisdictional base of state business
takeover statutes. On this basis alone, many existing state statutes will fall in
the face of constitutional challenges founded on commerce clause grounds. 28°
The curiously compromised majority holding in Edgar v. MITE Corp., com-
bined with the absence of opinions on the merits by the three dissenters, is not,
however, conclusive as to the future of state business takeover regulation. The
Supreme Court rendered a decision which grants the lower courts considerable
flexibility, but no clear guidance, for evaluating the constitutional status of re-
maining and future state statutes.
IV. THE FUTURE OF STATE REGULATION OF TENDER OFFERS:
IMPACT OF MITE
Judicial response to state business takeover statutes in the wake of MITE
demonstrates that the courts are continuing to apply the commerce clause
analysis to the detriment of the state statutes. Courts applying MITE to in-
validate state business takeover statutes on commerce clause grounds focus on
the broad extraterritorial reach of the statutes's' and the speculative protections
278 See supra text accompanying notes 211-232.
279 See supra note 6.
280 Typically, the state statutes contain severability clauses. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
49:5-18 (West Supp. 1982-1983). The issue of severability was not, however, addressed in
MITE, nor has it been litigated in the wake of the MITE holding.
Televest, Inc. v. Bradshaw (E.D. Va. September 29, 1982), [current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 199,044 (court noted that the Virginia statute, applicable to only Virginia corpora-
tions, nonetheless affected a domestic corporation 40% of whose shareholders were non-residents
of Virginia). Id. at i 99,044; Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 566 (6th
Cir. 1982) (court noted that nearly ninety-five percent of shareholders of target corporation were
non-residents of state of Missouri); Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 639 S.W.2d 768, 744 (Ky. Sup. Ct.)
(in case involving corporation where over one-half of shareholders were out-of-state residents,
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they afford. 282 One court simply invoked the MITE commerce clause standard
without considering the merits.of the individual case presented.'" Reaction to
the absence of a preemption holding in MITE is mixed. While most of the deci-
sions cast their holdings in commerce clause terms,'" one court relied heavily,
although not exclusively, on preemption grounds, despite the absence of a
preemption holding in MITE. 285
There is a pervading tone in both pre- and post-MITE decisions that
underscores the courts' anathema to any interference in the nationwide tender
offer mechanism. The Seventh Circuit in MITE pointed out that the blocking
of the tender offer under consideration meant the failure of a twenty-three
million dollar transaction in interstate commerce. 286 In the wake of MITE,
courts are continuing to emphasize the nationwide impact of a state's business
takeover statute. 287
The blanket rejection of the internal affairs doctrine as a justification for
state business takeover statutes is perhaps the most devastating blow dealt to
the future of state tender offer regulation. In subsequent litigation, states may
attempt to advance with greater vigor alternative bases of jurisdiction. The
other jurisdictional theory with any force is that a host state has a valid interest
in the affairs of corporations conducting business in the state.'" This argu-
ment, however, so emphasizes the protective aspects of state jurisdiction that
the argument is of little value. 288 In addition, the continued emphasis on the
nationwide character of a tender offer highlights the strength of the interstate
commerce analysis. 290 It is, thus, the author's opinion that existing state tender
offer statutes will not survive MITE and its implications as to the validity of
state jurisdiction in the area. It is nevertheless important to apply the MITE
decision to the remaining provisions of the proposed Uniform Act, in order to
court held that Kentucky had no legitimate state interest in protecting shareholders who do not
live in the state).
282 Televest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, [current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at ¶ 94,973 (pur-
ported protections of the Virginia statute are too speculative to sustain the statute in the instant
case).
288
	 City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1124, 1131 (8th Cir. 1982). ,
284 See supra note 281. See also, Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Service Co. (WM. Okla.
December 21, 1982), [current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 199,064 (court invoked MITE
language emphasizing nationwide impact of statute and declared Oklahoma statute unconstitu-
tional on a motion for summary judgment).
285 National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1131 (8th Cir. 1982).
288
 MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 502 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
287
	 supra note 281.
288 See supra note 82.
2" See, e.g., Boehm, supra note 12, at 757 ("[A] realistic view is that the dominant state
interest is in the preservation of independent economic entities.").
29° To date, application of the MITE decision has resulted in invalidation of the state
statutes in all but one of the cases. The First Circuit remanded consideration of the
Massachusetts statute in light of the MITE opinion. Agency Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Spencer Cos.,
686 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982).
July 1983]	 CASENOTES	 1049
evaluate the advisability of a state's attempting to restructure its business
takeover statute to withstand constitutional challenge. 29 '
The friendly offer exemption is rightfully excluded from the proposed Act,
as it exhibits a decidedly pro-management bent and leaves the statute vul-
nerable to an attack similar to that articulated by Justice White with respect to
the Illinois Act's exemption. 292
 While some criticism has been leveled at certain
state statutes exemptions because they appear to target only large
companies, 293
 the exemption for tender offers for companies with less than one
hundred shareholders is justifiable. There does not appear to be anything in-
herently wrong or discriminatory in a state's focusing its resources on larger
companies. Indeed, this approach may be supported upon the theory that the
burden on small companies would be too great as compared to the benefits
such regulation would bring.
Two other exemptions, however, may not be dismissed so easily. The
vesting of discretionary power in the state securities administrator to exempt an
offer if not made with the purpose or effect of changing or influencing control of
the subject company is one such provision. 294 Arguably, the exemption may be
defended on the ground that a change in control does involve the internal af-
fairs of a corporation, if indeed there is any life left in the internal affairs
justification. The exemption implies, however, that the state may use its discre-
tion to come to the aid of incumbent management. It appears, for instance,
that a friendly tender offer may be structured so as not to change "control" of
the corporation, thus avoiding the Act's provisions. State business takeover
statutes, if the courts are to permit them at all, must be precisely and narrowly
drawn. This exemption should therefore be excluded.
A final noteworthy exemption is that granting immunity from the registra-
tion requirements of the Act if an offer is subject to review by a federal agency
and if the state securities administrator determines that the purposes of the
291
 In analyzing the ability of a state statute to withstand constitutional challenges in the
future, one important caveat must be entered. Past action by the SEC demonstrates its proclivity
to further occupy the field of tender offer regulation. The SEC admitted that its introduction of
new rules in 1980 was designed to produce a conflict with state pre-commencement notification
and waiting period provisions "so direct and substantial as to make it impossible to comply with
both sets of requirements as they presently exist." Securities Exchange Act Release No.
34-16384 [1979-1980] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,254. The SEC acted in response to statutes
similar in scope to the one struck down by the MITE Court and it is conceivable that the SEC
would respond similarly to new and different state regulatory approaches. For instance, the area
of creeping tender offers is not presently regulated at the federal level. SEC General Counsel Ed-
ward F. Greene stated that he opposed the Massachusetts-style takeover provisions in this area,
and predicted that the SEC will get involved in regulating creeping tender offers. Special Report
Vol. 14, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA), 5/7/82, at 811. Thus, the future of state takeover regula-
tion will be determined not only by its ability to survive MITE, but also will be subject to the con-
tinually expanding role of the SEC.
292 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2643 (19132).
993 Wilner & Landy, supra note 12, at 8.
294 NASAA Tender Offer Proposals, supra note 174, at G-4 (Uniform Act, S 4(e)).
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Uniform Act are met thereby. 295 At first blush, this exemption appears accept-
able. If the language of the majority's commerce clause opinion is followed
closely by other courts, however, this provision may lead to a dismissal of the
state interest in protecting the investor. Specifically, the MITE majority held
that the Illinois Act's reliance on the protection afforded by the Williams Act
countered the Illinois defense that further investor protection was its goal. 296
Again, following the strict and narrow path, such a questionable exemption
should be excluded.
The Uniform Act's requirements with respect to disclosure are generally
no more rigorous or salient than the Williams Act provisions. It, therefore,
does not appear that investors are aided by any substantive disclosure not
already provided by the federal scheme. In fact, the Uniform Act gives the state
securities administrator the discretion to permit an offeror to file any statement
filed with the SEC in lieu of the registration requirement specified by the
Act. 297 This demonstrates a further problem with the Uniform Act. While it
does not conflict with or frustrate the Williams Act in its registration re-
quirements, neither does it extend meaningful additional investor protection.
At this juncture, then, there is little to be weighed against the burdens the
statute would impose on interstate commerce.
One requirement of the Uniform Act, not contained in the Williams Act,
is a description of the offeror's other tender offer activity within the last five
years. 298 While no such disclosure is called for by the federal scheme, there are
no compelling arguments against such a requirement. There is some commen-
tary to the effect that local shareholders may view with greater suspicion the ac-
tivities of a corporate predator if its history reveals a pattern of raiding local
companies and in many cases relocating the business. 299 While such protec-
tionism certainly would not be constitutionally tolerable on the part of a state,
there is no constitutional prohibition against individual shareholders exercising
these parochial interests independent of state action. In addition, there is
limited evidence that those companies who characteristically participate in cor-
porate takeovers actually have shown poor economic results. 300 Consequently,
it may be argued, a state has a legitimate right to mandate full disclosure of
such activities. It is not arguable, however, that the single additional protection
of this one disclosure constitutes a benefit which would serve to outweigh the
statute's burdens.
295 Id. (Uniform Act, $ 4(f)).
296 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2642 (1982).
297 NASAA Tender Offer Proposals, supra note 174, at G-4 (Uniform Act, 4(f)).
298 Id.
299 See Boehm, supra note 12, at 745-46.
'°° Nordhaus, The Vanity of the Takeover Game, N.Y TIMES, October 3, 1982, at F-3.
Nordhaus conducted a study of the profitability of corporations who actively participate in
takeovers. "The Vulture Fund" is a fictitious investment vehicle which on December 31, 1980
invested an equal amount of money in the following ten "acquisitive" companies: Du Pont,
U.S. Steel, Connecticut General (Signa), Seagram, Freeport Minerals, Fluor, Nabisco, Stand-
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The substantive review of tender offers by state regulatory authorities has
generally been viewed by the preemptionists as the substitution of investor pro-
tection for investor autonomy."' While the Uniform Act avoids this pitfall, the
hearing provisions nevertheless present grave questions on the Uniform Act's
constitutional validity. In Justice White's preemption holding, the Illinois
Act's hearing provisions were found objectionable because of the open-ended
delays occasioned by the hearing provisions.'" Under the Illinois Act, a hear-
ing could be requested by ten percent of the target's shareholders, who were
often members of management. 303 In contrast, a hearing under the Uniform
Act is commenced only in the discretion of the Administrator. 3" The Uniform
Act requires a hearing to begin within twenty-five days of the filing of a
registration statement"' and any order of the administrator prohibiting the of-
feror from purchasing tendered shares expires on the earlier of thirty days from
the completion of the hearing or sixty days after the filing of a registration state-
ment. The delay in the execution of a tender offer is, therefore, not as poten-
tially significant as that permitted in the Illinois Act. It may be argued,
therefore, that the somewhat longer delays than those at the federal level will
not automatically invalidate the Uniform Act on the basis of the holding in
MITE. This argument is significantly weakened by MITE's progeny, however,
which continue to emphasize the nationwide character of a tender offer. 306 One
recent case where a state statute was invalidated involved a hearing provision
which, like the Uniform Act, called for review of only full and fair disclosure,
not the substantive fairness evaluation required by the Illinois Act. 307 Further-
more, from a state's vantage point, it is obvious that a statute must have
substantive enforcement provisions in order to have any effect. The Uniform
Act has not, however, demonstrated any additional significant investor protec-
tion which would justify a state's right to block a tender offer governed by the
Williams Act.
The Uniform Act may be a valid state statute to the extent that it regulates
non-Williams Act transactions,'" with the exception of the creeping tender of-
fer area. While there is still the unresolved threshold issue of incidental out-of-
state regulation, there is a strong argument for the need to protect all investors.
The cases and commentators have not, however, focused on this point. The
Uniform Act, however, suffers from the result of careful attempts to draft a
and Oil of Ohio, Smith Klein and American Express. Nordhaus finds that The Vulture Fund
would have fallen 16.3% from the end of 1980 to September, 1982. This compares with a fall in
the broad-gauged stock averages of only 4 to 9% over this same period.
30 ' See, e.g., MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 494 (7th Cir. 1980), of 'd sub nom.
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
302 102 S. Ct. at 2638-39.
3 °3 ILL. STAT. ANN. ch . 121 y2, S 137.57.7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983).
3 °4 NASAA Tender Offer Proposals, supra note 174, at G-5 (Uniform Act, 5 7(a)).
3 °3 Id. (Uniform Act, 5 6).
306 See supra note 281.
30 ' Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 639 S.W.2d 768, 773 (Ky. Sup. Ct. 1982).
3 °8 See supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
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statute which is meaningful, yet survives constitutional challenge. While the
proposed Uniform Act presents a better case than existing state statutes, the
NASAA has not succeeded in presenting the states with a statute which is
either potent or constitutionally viable. Moreover, in the wake of MITE, it ap-
pears that such a statute cannot be drawn.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp. has provided the
courts with a commerce clause holding to be applied in evaluating the constitu-
tionality of state business takeover statutes. The Supreme Court did not reach
a holding on the strong preemption arguments, but rather invalidated the Il-
linois Act based on its failure to provide benefits in excess of the burdens it im-
posed on interstate commerce. The splintered MITE decision neither clearly
nor explicitly resolved the future of state tender offer regulation. The Supreme
Court did, however, leave the courts with a great deal of flexibility. MITE has
given the courts a powerful standard which will allow them to invalidate re-
maining state business takeover regulation. To date, courts generally have
demonstrated that they will apply the MITE decision to strike down existing
state regulation. Furthermore, a review of a carefully and narrowly drawn
statute, such as the NASAA's Uniform Take-Over Act, demonstrates that,
with the possible exception of non-Williams Act transactions, the states are
powerless to enact meaningful, yet constitutionally permissible, tender offer
legislation.
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